Supreme Court of India
Shri Dilip K. Basu vs State
Of West Bengal & Ors on 24 July, 2015
Bench: T.S. Thakur, R.
Banumathi
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION
CRL.M.P. NO.16086 OF
1997
IN
CRL.M.P. NO.4201 OF
1997
Dilip K. Basu
…Petitioner
Versus
State of West Bengal &
Ors. …Respondents
WITH
CRL.M.P. NO.4201 OF 1997, 4105 OF 1999, 2600
OF 2000, 2601 OF 2000, 480 OF
2001, 3965, 10385 OF 2002, 12704 OF 2001,
19694 OF 2010 IN CRL.M.P. NO.
4201 OF 1997, CRL.M.P. NO. 13566 OF 2011 IN
CRL.M.P. NO. 16086 OF 1997 IN
CRL.M.P. NO. 4201 OF 1997, CRL.M.P. NO. 15490
OF 2014 & 15492 OF 2014 IN
WRIT PETITION (CRL.)NO.
539 OF 1986
J U D G M E N T
T.S.
THAKUR, J.
1. In
D.K. Basu etc. v. State of West Bengal etc.[1] [D.K. Basu (1)] this Court
lamented the growing incidence of torture and deaths in police custody. This
Court noted that although violation of one or the other of the human rights has
been the subject matter of several Conventions and Declarations and although
commitments have been made to eliminate the scourge of custodial torture yet
gruesome incidents of such torture continue unabated. The court described
‘custodial torture’ as a naked violation of human dignity and degradation that
destroys self-esteem of the victim and does not even spare his personality.
Custodial torture observed the Court is a calculated assault on human dignity
and whenever human dignity is wounded, civilisation takes a step backwards. The
Court relied upon the Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and
the Third Report of the National Police Commission in India to hold that
despite recommendations for banishing torture from investigative system,
growing incidence of torture and deaths in police custody come back to haunt.
Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and
Ors.[2]; Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa and
Ors.[3]; State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi and Ors.[4]; and the 113th report of the Law
Commission of India recommending insertion of Section 114-B in the Indian Evidence Act, this Court held that while the
freedom of an individual must yield to the security of the State, the right to
interrogate the detenus, culprits or arrestees in the interest of the nation
must take precedence over an individual’s right to personal liberty. Having
said that the action of the State, observed this Court, must be just and fair.
Using any form of torture for extracting any kind of information would neither
be right nor just or fair, hence, impermissible, and offensive to Article 21 of the Constitution. A crime
suspect, declared the court, may be interrogated and subjected to sustained and
scientific interrogation in the manner determined by the provisions of law, but,
no such suspect can be tortured or subjected to third degree methods or
eliminated with a view to eliciting information, extracting a confession or
deriving knowledge about his accomplices, weapons etc. His constitutional right
cannot be abridged except in the manner permitted by law, though in the very
nature of things there would be a qualitative difference in the method of
interrogation of such a person as compared to an ordinary criminal. State
terrorism declared this Court is no answer to combat terrorism. It may only
provide legitimacy to terrorism, which is bad for the State and the community
and above all for the rule of law. Having said that, the Court issued the
following directions and guidelines in all cases of arrest and/or detention:
“35. we therefore,
consider it appropriate to issue the following requirements to be followed in
all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf
as preventive measures:
(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest
and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible
and clear identification and name togs with their designations. The particulars
of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be
recorded in a register.
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest
of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest such memo
shall be attested by at least one witness who may be either a member of the
family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the
arrest is made. It shall also be counter signed by the arrestee and shall
contain the time and date of arrest.
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and
is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other
lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known
to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as
practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular
place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a
friend or a relative of the arrestee.
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody
of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative
of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the legal Aid
Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned
telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this
right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon he is put
under arrest or is detained.
(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place
of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the
name of he next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and
the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee
is.
(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be
also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any
present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The "Inspection
Memo" must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting
the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.
(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical
examination by trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by
a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health
Services of the concerned Stare or Union Territory. Director, Health Services
should prepare such a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo
of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the illaqa Magistrate for his
record.
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his
lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A police control room should be provided at
all district and state headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and
the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer
causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police
control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.”
2. This
Court also examined whether compensation could be awarded and declared that
pecuniary compensation was permissible in appropriate cases by way of redressal
upon proof of infringement of fundamental rights of a citizen by the public
servants and that the State was vicariously liable for their acts. The Court
further held that compensation was payable on the principle of strict liability
to which the defence of sovereign immunity was not available and that the
citizen must receive compensation from the State as he/she has a right to be
indemnified by the government.
4. What
falls for consideration before us at present are the prayers made in Crl.M.P.
No.15492 of 2014 filed by Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Senior Advocate, who was
appointed Amicus Curiae in this case. The Amicus has, in the said application,
sought further directions from this Court in terms of Paras 10(A) to 10(O) of
the said Crl. M.P. When the application initially came-up for hearing before
this Court on 5th August, 2014, we gave a final opportunity to the
respondents-States to respond to the prayers made in the same. We, at the same
time, requested Dr. Singhvi to identify areas that need attention and make
specific recommendations for consideration of this Court based on the responses
filed by the States/Union Territories to the application filed by him. Dr.
Singhvi has accordingly filed a summary of recommendations, which, according to
him, deserve to be examined and accepted while concluding these proceedings
which have remained pending in this Court for the past 30 years or so. We,
therefore, propose to deal with the recommendations so summarised by the Amicus
Curiae, having regard to the responses of the States filed and also the need
for giving quietus to the issues that have engaged the attention of this Court
for such a long time.
5. The
Amicus has, in paras 10(A) to 10(B) of the application, sought suitable
directions from this Court of setting-up of State Human Rights Commissions in
the States of Delhi, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura and
Nagaland, where such Commissions have not been set-up even after two decades
have passed since the enactment of theProtection of Human
Rights Act, 1993. The application
points out that Delhi has reported the second highest number of human rights
violation cases reported to National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). It refers
to the NHRC Curtain Raiser published on its 20th Foundation Day, according to
which out of a total number of 94,985 fresh cases registered in the NHRC the
largest number of cases (46,187) came from the State of Uttar Pradesh followed
by Delhi, which reported 7,988 cases and Haryana, which reported 6,921 cases.
Despite a large number of complaints alleging violation of human rights from
the Delhi region, the Delhi Government has not set-up a State Human Rights
Commission so far. The application further points out that Mizoram, Meghalaya,
Tripura and Nagaland are all disturbed States with problems of insurgency,
foreign immigration, tribal warfare and ethnic violence apart from custodial
violence and deaths, which according to the Amicus, are rampant in each one of
these States making it necessary to have a proper authority to look into such
violations and grant redress wherever necessary.
6.
Despite an opportunity granted for the purpose, the States that have failed to
set-up Human Rights Commissions have not come forward to offer any
justification for their omission to do so. All that was argued by some of the
counsel appearing for the defaulting States is that the establishment of a
Commission is not mandatory in terms of Section 21 of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993. It was urged that the use of words ‘A State Government may
constitute a body to be known as the……………(Name of the State) Human Rights
Commission’ clearly suggests that the State Government may or may not choose to
constitute such a body. In the absence of any mandatory requirement under the
Act constitution of a State Human Rights Commission cannot, it was urged, be
ordered by this Court in the present proceedings.
7. There
is, in our opinion, no merit in the contention urged on behalf of the
defaulting States. We say so for reasons more than one, but, before we advert
to the same we wish to point out that Protection of Human
Rights Act, 1993 symbolises the
culmination of a long drawn struggle and crusade for protection of human rights
in this country as much as elsewhere is the world. The United Nations (UN)
General Assembly in December, 1948 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which was a significant step towards formulating and recognizing such
rights. It was, then, followed by an International Bill of Rights which was
binding on the covenanting parties. Since the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was not legally binding and since United Nations had no machinery for
its enforcement, the deficiency was removed by the UN General Assembly by
adopting in December, 1965 two covenants for the observance of human rights
viz. (i) the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and (ii) the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The first covenant formulated legally
enforceable rights of the individual while second required the States to
implement them by legislation. These covenants came into force in December,
1976 after the requisite number of member States ratified them. Many of the
States ratified the Covenants subsequently at the end of 1981. These Covenants
thus become legally binding on the ratifying States and since India is a party
to the said Covenants, the President of India promulgated the Protection of
Human Rights Ordinance, 1993 on 28th September, 1993 to provide for the constitution
of a National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commissions in the
States and Human Rights Courts for better protection of human rights and for
matters connected therewith. The ordinance was shortly thereafter replaced by
the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
8. In the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 it, is inter alia, mentioned that India is a party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 16th December, 1966. It is further stated
that the human rights embodied in the said Covenants are substantially
protected by the Constitution and that there is a growing concern about the
changing social realities and the emerging trends in the nature of crime and
violence. The Statement of Objects and Reasons also refers to the wide ranging
discussions that were held at various fora such as the Chief Ministers’
Conference on Human Rights, seminars organized in various parts of the country
and the meetings with leaders of various political parties, which culminated in
the presentation of Protection of Human Rights Bill, 1993 that came to be
passed by both the Houses of Parliament and received the assent of the
President on 8th January, 1994 taking retrospective effect from 28th September,
1993. The significance of the human rights and the need for their protection
and enforcement is thus beyond the pale of any debate. The movement for the
protection of such rights is not confined only to India alone. It is a global
phenomenon. It is, in this backdrop that the provisions of Section 21 of the Act need to be examined.
It is true that a plain reading of the provisions may give the impression that
the setting-up of a State Human Rights Commission rests in the discretion of
the State Government. But a closer and more careful analysis of the provisions
contained in the Act dispel that impression.Section 21 of the Act, which deals with the
setting-up of State Human Rights Commission, is in the following terms:
“21.
Constitution of State Human Rights Commission.— (1) A State Government may
constitute a body to be known as the ............................. (Name of the
State) Human Rights Commission to exercise the powers conferred upon, and to
perform the functions assigned to a State Commission under this Chapter. (2)
The State Commission shall, with effect from such date as the State Government
may by notification specify, consist of—
(a) a
Chairperson who has been a Chief Justice of a High Court;
(b) one
Member who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court or District Judge in the
State with a minimum of seven years experience as District Judge;
(c) one
Member to be appointed from among persons having knowledge of or practical
experience in matters relating to human rights. (3) There shall be a
Secretary who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the State Commission and
shall exercise such powers and discharge such functions of the State Commission
as it may delegate to him. (4) The headquarters of the State Commission
shall be at such place as the State Government may, by notification, specify.
(5) A
State Commission may inquire into violation of human rights only in respect of
matters relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II and List III in
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution: Provided that if any such matter is
already being inquired into by the Commission or any other Commission duly
constituted under any law for the time being in force, the State Commission
shall not inquire into the said matter: Provided further that in relation to
the Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Commission, this sub-section shall have
effect as if for the words and figures “List II and List III in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution”, the words and figures “List III in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
and in respect of matters in relation to which the Legislature of that State
has power to make laws” had been substituted.
(6) Two
or more State Governments may, with the consent of a Chairperson or Member of a
State Commission, appoint such Chairperson or, as the case may be, such Member
of another State Commission simultaneously if such Chairperson or Member consents
to such appointment: Provided that every appointment made under this
sub-section shall be made offer obtaining the recommendations of the committee
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 22 in respect of the state for which
a common chairman or member, or both, the case may be, is to be appointed.”
9. A
plain reading of the above would show that the Parliament has used the word
‘may’ in sub-Section (1) while providing for the setting-up of a State Human
Rights Commission. In contrast the Parliament has used the word ‘shall’ in
sub-Section (3) while providing for constitution of a National Commission. The
argument on behalf of the defaulting States, therefore, was that the use of two
different expressions which dealing with the subject of analogous nature is a
clear indication that while a National Human Rights Commission is mandatory a
State Commission is not. That argument is no doubt attractive, but does not
stand close scrutiny. The use of word ‘may’ is not by itself determinative of
the true nature of the power or the obligation conferred or created under a
provision. The legal position on the subject is fairly well settled by a long
line of decisions of this Court. The stated position is that the use of word
‘may’ does not always mean that the authority upon which the power is vested
may or may not exercise that power. Whether or not the word ‘may’ should be
construed as mandatory and equivalent to the word ‘shall’ would depend upon the
object and the purpose of the enactment under which the said power is conferred
as also related provisions made in the enactment. The word ‘may’ has been often
read as ‘shall’ or ‘must’ when there is something in the nature of the thing to
be done which must compel such a reading. In other words, the conferment of the
power upon the authority may having regard to the context in which such power
has been conferred and the purpose of its conferment as also the circumstances
in which it is meant to be exercised carry with such power an obligation which
compels its exercise. The locus classicus on the subject is found in Julius v.
Bishop of Oxford[12] where Justice Cairns, L.C. observed:
“…The
words ‘it shall be lawful’ are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous.
They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would
otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power, and
they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But there may
be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the
object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it
is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose
benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty,
and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise
that power when called upon to do so. …” Lord Blackburn in the same case
observed:
“I do not
think the words “it shall be lawful” are in themselves ambiguous at all. They
are apt words to express that a power is given; and as, prima facie, the donee
of a power may either exercise it or leave it unused, it is not inaccurate to
say that, prima facie, they are equivalent to saying that the donee may do it;
but if the object for which the power is conferred is for the purpose of
enforcing a right, there may be a duty cast on the donee of the power, to
exercise it for the benefit of those who have that right, when required on
their behalf….”
10. A
long line of decisions of this Court starting with Sardar Govind Rao and Ors.
v. State of Madhya Pradesh[13] have followed the above line of reasoning and
authoritatively held that the use of the word ‘may’ or ‘shall’ by themselves do
not necessarily suggest that one is directory and the other mandatory, but, the
context in which the said expressions have been used as also the scheme and the
purpose underlying the legislation will determine whether the legislative
intent really was to simply confer the power or such conferment was accompanied
by the duty to exercise the same. In The Official
Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan Pvt. Ltd.[14] this Court summed up the legal position thus :
“In fact
it is quite accurate to say that the word "may" by itself, acquires
the meaning' of "must" or "shall" sometimes. This word
however, always signifies a conferment of power. That power may, having regard
to the context in which it occurs, and the requirements contemplated for its
exercise, have annexed to it an obligation which compels its exercise in a
certain way on facts and circumstances from which the obligation to exercise it
in that way arises. In other words, it is the context which can attach the
obligation to the power compel- ling its exercise in a certain way. The
context, both legal and factual, may impart to the power that obligatoriness.
Thus, the question to be determined in such cases always is, whether the power
conferred by the use of the word "may" has, annexed to it, an obligation
that, on the fulfilment of certain legally prescribed conditions, to be shown
by evidence, a particular kind of order must be made. If the statute leaves no
room for discretion the power has to be exercised in the manner indicated by
the other legal provisions which provide the legal context. Even then the facts
must establish that the legal conditions are fulfilled: A power is exercised
even when the Court rejects an application to exercise it in the particular way
in which the applicant desires it to be exercised. Where the power is wide
enough to cover both an acceptance and a refusal of an application for its
exercise, depending upon facts, it is directory or discretionary. It is not the
conferment of a power which the word "may" indicates that annexes any
obligation to its exercise but the legal and factual context of it.”
11. So
also, this Court in ND Jayal and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.[15] interpreted the provisions of the
Environmental Protection Act, 1986 to mean that the power conferred under the
Act was not a power simpliciter, but, was power coupled with duty. Unless the
Act was so interpreted sustainable development and protection of life
under Article 21 was not possible
observed the Court. In Manushkhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat[16] this Court held that the scheme of
the statute is determinative of the nature of duty or power conferred upon the
authority while determining whether such power is obligatory, mandatory or
directory and that even if that duty is not set out clearly and specifically in
the stature, it may be implied as correlative to a right. Numerous other
pronouncements of this Court have similarly addressed and answered the issue.
It is unnecessary to refer to all those decisions for we remain content with
reference to the decision of this Court in Bachahan Devi and Anr. v. Nagar
Nigam, Gorakhpur and Anr.[17] in which the position was succinctly
summarized as under:
“18. It
is well settled that the use of word `may' in a statutory provision would not
by itself show that the provision is directory in nature. In some cases, the
legislature may use the word `may' as a matter of pure conventional courtesy
and yet intend a mandatory force. In order, therefore, to interpret the legal
import of the word `may', the court has to consider various factors, namely,
the object and the scheme of the Act, the context and the background against
which the words have been used, the purpose and the advantages sought to be
achieved by the use of this word, and the like. It is equally well-settled that
where the word `may' involves a discretion coupled with an obligation or where
it confers a positive benefit to a general class of subjects in a utility Act,
or where the court advances a remedy and suppresses the mischief, or where
giving the words directory significance would defeat the very object of the
Act, the word `may' should be interpreted to convey a mandatory force. As a
general rule, the word `may' is permissive and operative to confer discretion
and especially so, where it is used in juxtaposition to the word 'shall', which
ordinarily is imperative as it imposes a duty. Cases however, are not wanting
where the words `may' `shall', and `must' are used interchangeably. In order to
find out whether these words are being used in a directory or in a mandatory
sense, the intent of the legislature should be looked into along with the
pertinent circumstances. The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory
effect of the language depends upon the language couched in the statute under
consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in
the use of the word `shall' or `may' depends on conferment of power. Depending
upon the context, 'may' does not always mean may. 'May' is a must for enabling
compliance of provision but there are cases in which, for various reasons, as
soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it
becomes his duty to exercise that power. Where the language of statute creates
a duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty.
20. If it
appears to be the settled intention of the legislature to convey the sense of
compulsion, as where an obligation is created, the use of the word 'may' will
not prevent the court from giving it the effect of Compulsion or obligation.
Where the statute was passed purely in public interest and that rights of
private citizens have been considerably modified and curtailed in the interests
of the general development of an area or in the interests or removal of slums
and unsanitary areas. Though the power is conferred upon the statutory body by
the use of the word 'may' that power must be construed as a statutory duty.
Conversely, the use of the term 'shall' may indicate the use in optional or
permissive sense. Although in general sense 'may' is enabling or discretional
and `shall' is obligatory, the connotation is not inelastic and
inviolate." Where to interpret the word `may' as directory would render
the very object of the Act as nugatory, the word 'may' must mean 'shall'.
21. The
ultimate rule in construing auxiliary verbs like `may' and `shall' is to
discover the legislative intent; and the use of words `may' and 'shall' is not
decisive of its discretion or mandates. The use of the words `may' and `shall'
may help the courts in ascertaining the legislative intent without giving to
either a controlling or a determinating effect. The courts have further to
consider the subject matter, the purpose of the provisions, the object intended
to be secured by the statute which is of prime importance, as also the actual
words employed.” (emphasis supplied)
12. The
above decision also dispels the impression that if the Parliament has used the
words “may” and “shall” at the places in the same provision, it means that the
intention was to make a distinction in as much as one was intended to be
discretionary while the other mandatory. This is obvious from the following
passage where this Court declared that even when the two words are used in the
same provision the Court’s power to discover the true intention of the
legislature remains unaffected:
“22.
…..Obviously where the legislature uses two words may and shall in two
different parts of the same provision prima facie it would appear that the
legislature manifested its intent on to make one part directory and another
mandatory. But that by itself is not decisive. The power of court to find out
whether the provision is directory or mandatory remains unimpaired.”
13. When
we examine the scheme of the legislation and the provisions ofSection 21 (supra) in the light of the above
principles, the following broad features emerge prominently:
that the
Act is aimed at providing an efficacious and transparent mechanism for
prevention of violation of human rights both at national level as also at the
state level;
that the
National Human Rights Commission is vested with the powers and functions set
out in Chapter-III of comprising Sections 12 to 16 of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1963. While in relation to State Human Rights Commissions similar provisions
of Sections 9, 10, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15to 18 apply mutatis mutandis subject to
certain modifications referred to in clauses (a) to (d) of the said provision.
This implies that he powers exercisable by the State Commissions under the said
provisions are pari materia with the powers exercisable by the National Human
Rights Commission.
(iii)
that while Section 3 does use the word
‘shall’ in relation to the constitution of a National Human Rights Commission,
the absence of a similar expression in Section and the use of the word ‘may’ as
observed by this Court in Bachahan Devi (supra) case makes little difference as
the scheme of the Act and the true intention underlying the legislation is to
be determined by the Court depending upon whether the power was coupled with a
duty to exercise the same or was conferment of power simpliciter.
14. Time
now to refer to certain other provisions of the Act. In terms ofSection 13(6) of the Act, the National Commission
is empowered whenever considered necessary or expedient so to do, to transfer
any complaint filed or pending before it to the State Commission of the State
from which the complaint arises for disposal in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, subject to the condition that the complaint is one respecting which
the State Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the same. Upon such transfer
the State Commission is competent to dispose of the matter as if complaint was
initially filed before it. The power of the State Commission, it is noteworthy,
is confined to matters enumerated in List-II and List-III of the Constitution
in terms of Section 21 sub-Section (5)
extracted earlier. Significantly, Section 12 applicable to State Commissions
also provides for not only inquiries into complaints of violation of human
rights or abetment thereof and negligence in the prevention of such violation,
by a public servant but also matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (g). the
provision enjoins upon the State Commissions the task of spreading human rights
literacy among various sections of the society and promoting awareness about
the safeguards available for the protection of those rights through
publications in the media, seminars and other available means; and to encourage
the efforts of non-governmental organizations and institutions working in the
field of human rights; and to perform all such other functions as may be
considered necessary for the promotion of human rights. All these functions are
critical for the promotion and protection of human rights at the State level.
The essence of a statutory Commission will, therefore, have the effect of
negating the legislative intent that human rights need to be promoted and
protected against violations. The State Governments cannot frustrate the
objects underlying the legislation but pleading that the legislative measure
notwithstanding they can in their discretion keep the setting-up of the
Commissions at bay. Any such contention will be destructive of the scheme of
the Act and the promise the law contains for the protection of the rights of
the people.
15. The
upshot of the above discussion that the power of the State Governments
under Section 21 to set-up State Human
Rights Commission in their respective areas/territories is not a power
simpliciter but a power coupled with the duty to exercise such power especially
when it is not the case of anyone of the defaulting States that there is no
violation of human rights in their territorial limits. The fact that Delhi has
itself reported the second largest number of cases involving human rights cases
would belie any such claim even if it were made. So also, it is not the case of
the North-Eastern States where such Commissions have not been set- up that
there are no violations of Human Rights in those States. The fact that most if
not all the States are affected by ethnic and other violence and extremist
activities calling for curbs affecting the people living in those areas
resulting, at times, in the violation of their rights cannot be disputed. Such
occurrence of violence and the state of affairs prevailing in most of the
States cannot support the contention that no such commissions are required in
those States as there are no human rights violations of any kind whatsoever.
16. There
is another angle from which the matter may be viewed. It touches the right of
the affected citizens to “access justice” and the denial of such access by
reason of non-setting up of the Commissions. In Imtiyaz Ahmad v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.[18] this Court has declared that access to justice is a
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This Court
observed:
“25….A
person's access to justice is a guaranteed fundamental right under the
Constitution and particularly Article 21. Denial of this right undermines
public confidence in the justice delivery system and incentivises people to
look for short-cuts and other fora where they feel that justice will be done
quicker. In the long run, this also weakens the justice delivery system and
poses a threat to Rule of Law.
26. It
may not be out of place to highlight that access to justice must not be
understood in a purely quantitative dimension. Access to justice in an
egalitarian democracy must be understood to mean qualitative access to
justice as well. Access to justice is, therefore, much more than improving an
individual's access to courts, or guaranteeing representation. It must be
defined in terms of ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes are just and
equitable (See United Nations Development Programme, Access to Justice
-
Practice Note (2004)].”
17. Human
rights violations in the States that are far removed from the NHRC headquarters
in Delhi itself makes access to justice for victims from those states an
illusion. While theoretically it is possible that those affected by violation
of human rights can approach the NHRC by addressing a complaint to the NHRC for
redressal, it does not necessarily mean that such access to justice for
redressal of human rights violation is convenient for the victims from the
states unless the States have set-up their own Commissions that would look into
such complaints and grant relief. We need to remember that access to justice so
much depends upon the ability of the victim to pursue his or her grievance
before the forum competent to grant relief. North-Eastern parts of the country
are mostly inhabited by the tribals. Such regions cannot be deprived of the
beneficial provisions of the Act simply because the States are small and the
setting-up of commissions in those states would mean financial burden for the
exchequer. Even otherwise there is no real basis for the contention that
financial constrains prevent these States from setting-up their own
Commissions. At any rate, the provisions of Section 21(6) clearly provide for two or more
State Governments setting–up Commissions with a common Chairperson or Member.
Such appointments may be possible with the consent of Chairperson or Member
concerned but it is nobody’s case that any attempt had in that direction been
made but the same had failed on account of the persons concerned not agreeing
to take up the responsibility vis-a-vis the other State. Even the NHRC had in
its Annual Report (1996-1997) suggested that if financial constraint was really
one of the reasons for not setting-up of Commission in the North-Eastern
Regions, the State Governments could consider setting-up such commissions by
resorting toSection 21(6), which permits two States
having the same Chairperson or Members thereby considerably reducing the
expenses on the establishment of such Commissions.
18.
Reference in this connection may be made to the recommendations of the NHRC
published in its Annual Report for the year 2004-2005 where the commission
observed:
“16.1
State Human Rights Commissions have been set up in 151 States viz., the States
of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The Commission would like to reiterate its
view that the ‘better protection of human rights’ can be ensured if all the
States set up Human Rights Commission. The Commission also emphasizes that the
State Human Rights Commission which have already been set up or are proposed to
be set up should be in compliance with the ‘Paris Principles’.
16.2 The
Commission, on its part, has endeavoured to assist and guide the State
Commissions in whatever manner possible, whenever requests for such assistance
or guidance has been sought. The strengthening of the State Commissions, is an
important agenda in the Commission’s activities. With this in view, the
Commission has taken the initiative to have annual interactions with all the
State Human Rights Commissions, where mutual discussions take place.
16.3 The
first such annual meeting was held on the 30-01-2004, where the agenda included
coordination and sharing of information between the SHRCs and the Commission;
training, awareness building and substantive human rights issues. Taking
forward the initiative, the second meeting was convened on the 13-05-2005.
Apart from the various issues of concern discussed in the meeting, the meeting
concluded with the adoption of the following Resolution:-
“The
National Human Rights Commission and the State Human Rights Commissions present
hereby unanimously resolve to urge the State Governments to:-
Setup, on
priority, State Human Rights Commissions where the same do not exist.
b) Where,
there are State Human Rights Commissions or, are in the process of being setup,
it be ensured that they are structurally and financially independent as
envisaged in and, fully confirming to, the principles relating to the status of
national institutions (the “Paris Principles’) which were endorsed by the UN
General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20-12- 1993.
The
National and State Commissions also reiterate and remind the Governments, both,
at the Centre and in the States, that the primary obligation towards the
protection of human rights is that of the State and that the national human
rights institutions are for ‘better protection of human rights’.
16.4 The
Commission places great importance to these interactions especially keeping in
view the social, cultural and linguistic diversity that comprises our society.
Institutionalizing the mechanism of these annual interactions is one way the
Commission hopes to keep up the process of dialogue. It is thus, all the more
important that all the states expeditiously set up human rights Commissions.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. A
similar recommendation was made in the Annual Report for the year 2009-2010 of
NHRC. It said:
“10.1
Section 21 of the PHRA, 1993 as amended in 2006, provides for constitution of
State Human Rights Commissions (SHRCs) in all the States. The existence and
functioning of a Human Rights Commission in the State goes a long way in the
‘better’ protection and promotion of human rights. It is now an accepted fact
that good governance and human rights go hand in hand. The SHRCs have been
set-up in 18 States. The names of these States are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal….
10.2 The
NHRC is keen that SHRCs are set-up in all the States so that each and every
citizen of the country has easy recourse to better protection of ’human rights’
as well as for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The
Commission earnestly recommends to all those States which have not yet
constituted SHRCs to follow suit at the earliest in the interest of better
protection and promotion of human rights. …” (emphasis supplied)
20. Yet
again, the same has been reiterated in the Annual Report for the year 2010-2011
of NHRC in the following words:
“15.1 Section 21 of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993 as amended in 2006, stipulates constitution of State Human Rights
Commissions (SHRCs) in all the States. The creation of a Human Rights
Commission in all the States would definitely facilitate in `better’ protection
and promotion of human rights. It is now an accepted proposition that good
governance and human rights go hand in hand. During the period under report,
SHRCs were set up in two States, namely, Jharkhand and Sikkim, thus taking the
overall total of SHRCs in the country to 20. Eighteen States which already have
an SHRC are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh,
Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur,
Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. At
present, there is no Chairperson and Members in the Himachal Pradesh State
Human Rights Commission except for a Secretary.
15.2 NHRC
is keen that SHRCs are set up in every State of the country so that its
inhabitants have easy access to better protection of human rights and justice.
The Commission once again makes an earnest appeal to all those States which
have not yet constituted SHRCs to take action at the earliest in the interest
of better protection and promotion of human rights. In addition, the Commission
is in constant touch with all the SHRCs and renders technical support to them
as and when required by them.” (emphasis supplied)
21. It is
a matter of regret that despite the National Human Rights Commission itself
strongly and repeatedly recommending setting-up of State Commission in the
States the same have not been set-up. Keeping in view the totality of the
circumstances, therefore, we see no reason why the recommendation made by the
Amicus for a direction to the States of Delhi, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram,
Meghalaya, Tripura and Nagaland should not be issued to set-up State Human
Rights Commission in their respective territories.
22. The
other recommendation which the Amicus has noted for issue of suitable
directions relates to the filling-up of vacancy of Chairperson and Members in
several State Human Rights Commissions. The Amicus points out that in the
States of Manipur and Himachal Pradesh SHRC is not functional since post of
Chairperson and several Members remains unfilled. In the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, the post of Chairperson and one Member is vacant. In the State of
Jharkhand, the Chairperson is in position but the post of sole Member is
vacant. So also, in the State of Karnataka two Members in the Commission are
working while the post of Chairperson and one member remains vacant. Even in
the State of Tamil Nadu the post of Chairperson remains vacant. The Amicus
states that similar is the position in several other States also which means
that although States have set up SHRC, the same are dysfunctional on account of
non filling-up of the vacancies on account of administrative apathy and lethargy.
It was argued by the Amicus that dysfunctional SHRCs are as good as there being
no such Commissions at all thereby defeating the very purpose underlying the
Act and calling for a direction from this Court to the States concerned to fill
up the existing vacancies immediately and also to ensure that no vacancy in the
SHRC whether against the post of Chairperson or Members remains unfilled for
more than three months.
23. There
is, in our opinion, considerable merit in the submission made by the Amicus
that the very purpose of setting up of the State Human Rights Commission gets
defeated if vacancies that occur from time to time are not promptly filled up
and the Commission kept functional at all times. There is hardly any
explanation much less a cogent one for the failure of the State to take
immediate steps for filling-up of the vacancies wherever they have occurred.
The inaction or bureaucratic indifference or even the lack of political will
cannot frustrate the laudable object underlying the Parliamentary legislation.
With the number of complaints regarding breach of human rights increasing
everyday even in cities like Delhi which is the power centre and throbbing
capital of the county, there is no question of statutory Commissions being made
irrelevant or dysfunctional for any reason whatsoever. The power available to
the Government to fill up the vacancies wherever they exist is, as noticed
earlier, coupled with the duty to fill up such vacancies. The States ought to
realise that the Human Rights Commission set up by them are not some kind of
idle formality or dispensable ritual. The Commissions are meant to be watch
dogs for the protection of the human rights of the citizens and effective
instruments for redressal of grievances and grant of relief wherever necessary.
Denial of access to the mechanism conceptualised under the Act by reason of non
filling up of the vacancies directly affects the rights of the citizens and
becomes non functional. It is in that spirit that we deem it fit and proper to
direct that all vacancies against the post of Chairperson and Members of the
State Human Rights Commission shall be filled up by the concerned State
Governments as expeditiously as possible but, in any case, within a period of
three months from the date of this order. We only hope and trust that we shall
be spared the unpleasant task of initiating action against the defaulting State
in case the needful is not done within the time allotted. We also recommend to
the State Governments that since the dates on which vacancies are scheduled to
occur are known well in advance, (save and except where an incumbent dies in
office) the process for appointment of the incumbents against such vacancies
should be initiated well in time in future so that no post remains vacant in
any State Human Rights Commission for a period or unfilled for any period for
more than three months from the date the vacancy arises.
24. That
brings us to the third recommendation that Amicus has formulated concerning the
constitution of Human Rights Court in different districts in terms of Section 30 of The Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993. Section 30 of the Act provides
that the State Government shall specify with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the High Court, for each district a Court of Session to be a Human
Rights Court so that the offences arising out of violation of human rights are
tried and disposed of speedily. It was submitted that while the State of Sikkim
has complied with the said provision, other States are silent in that regard.
It was urged that if a small State like Sikkim could comply with the
requirement of specifying Sessions Courts to be Human Rights Court, there was
no reason why other States cannot follow suit. There is considerable merit in
that submission.Section 30 of the Act stipulates
that for providing speedy trial of offences arising out of violation of human
rights, the State Government, may with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of
the High Court, by notification, specify for each district a Court of Session
to be a Human Rights Court provided that if a Court of Session is already
specified as a special Court or a special Court is already constituted for such
offences under any other law for the time being in force, no such specification
of a Court would be necessary.
25. There
is, in our opinion, no reason why the State Governments should not seriously
consider the question of specifying human rights Court to try offences arising
out of violation of human rights. There is nothing on record to suggest that
the Governments have at all made any attempt in this direction or taken steps
to consult the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts. The least which
the State Governments can and ought to do is to take up the matter with the
Chief Justices of High Courts of their respective States and examine the feasibility
of specifying Human Rights Court in each district within the contemplation
of Section 30 of the Act. Beyond
that we do not propose to say anything at this stage.
26. There
are, apart from the above, few other recommendations made by the Amicus like
installation of CCTV Cameras in all Police Stations and prisons in a phased
manner, and appointment of non-official visitors to prisons and police stations
for making random and surprise inspections. Initiation of human proceedings
Under Section 302/304 IPC in each case where the
enquiry establishes culpability in custodial death and framing of uniform
definition of custodial death and mandatory deployment of atleast two women
constables in each district are also recommended by the Amicus.
27. As
regards installation of CCTV cameras in police stations and prisons, with a
view to checking human rights abuse, it is heartening to note that all the
States have in their affidavits supported the recommendation for installation
of CCTV cameras in Police Stations and prisons. In some of the States, steps
appear to have already been initiated in that direction. In the State of Bihar,
CCTV cameras in all prisons and in 44 police stations in the State have already
been installed. So also the State of Tamil Nadu plans to equip all police
stations with CCTV cameras. State of Haryana has stated that CCTV cameras should
be installed in all police stations, especially, at the entrance and in the
lockups. Union Territories of Andaman & Nicobar and Puducherry has also
installed CCTV cameras in most of the police stations. Some other States also
appear to be taking steps to do so. Some of the States have, however, remained
silent and non-committal on the issue. We do not for the present consider it
necessary to issue a direction for installation of CCTV cameras in all police
stations. We are of the opinion that the matter cannot be left to be considered
by the State Governments concerned, having regard to the fact that several
other State Governments have already taken action in that direction which we
consider is commendable. All that we need say is that the State Governments may
consider taking an appropriate decision in this regard, and appropriate action
wherever it is considered feasible to install CCTV cameras in police stations.
Some of these police stations may be located in sensitive areas prone to human
rights violation. The States would, therefore, do well in identifying such
police stations in the first instance and providing the necessary safeguard
against such violation by installing CCTV camera in the same. The process can
be completed in a phased manner depending upon the nature and the extent of
violation and the experience of the past.
28. In
regard to CCTV cameras in prison, we see no reason why all the States should
not do so. CCTV cameras will help go a long way in preventing violation of
human rights of those incarcerating in jails. It will also help the authorities
in maintaining proper discipline among the inmates and taking corrective
measures wherever abuses are noticed. This can be done in our opinion
expeditiously and as far as possible within a period of one year from the date
of this order.
29. That
leaves us with the appointment of non-official visitors to prisons and police
stations for making random and surprise inspection to check violation of human
rights. The Amicus points out that there are provisions in the Prison Manual
providing for appointment of non-official visitors to prisons in the State.
These appointments are made on the recommendations of the Magistrate of the
District in which the prison is situated. He urged that the provisions being
salutary ought to be invoked by the Governments concerned and non-official
visitors to prisons in police stations nominated including independent persons
like journalist. There is, in our opinion, no real harm or danger in
appointment of non-official visitors to prisons and police stations provided
the visitors who are so appointed do not interfere with the ongoing
investigations if any. All that we need say is that the State Governments may
take appropriate action in this regard keeping in view the provisions of the
Prison Manuals and the Police Acts and the Rules applicable to each
State.
30. That
leaves us with the question of initiation of criminal proceedings in cases
where enquiry establishes culpability in custodial deaths and for deployment of
atleast two women constables in each district. We see no reason why appropriate
proceedings cannot be initiated in cases where enquiry establishes culpability
of those in whose custody a victim dies or suffers any injuries or torture. The
law should take its course and those responsible duly and appropriately
proceeded against.
31. As
regards deployment of women constables all that we need say is that the States
concerned would consider the desirability of posting women constables in the
police stations wherever it is found that over a period of past two years women
were detained in connection with any criminal case or investigation. Needless
to say that in case women constables are needed in such police stations for
interrogation or detention, the State shall provide such infrastructural
facilities for such constables as are required.
To sum
up:
1. The
States of Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya,
Tripura and Nagaland shall within a period of six months from today set up
State Human Rights Commissions for their respective territories with or without
resort to provisions of Section 21(6) of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993.
2. All
vacancies, for the post of Chairperson or the Member of SHRC wherever they
exist at present shall be filled up by the State Governments concerned within a
period of three months from today.
3.
Vacancies occurring against the post of Chairperson or the Members of the SHRC
in future shall be filled up as expeditiously as possible but not later than
three months from the date such vacancy occurs.
4. The
State Governments shall take appropriate action in terms of Section 30 of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993, in regard to setting up/specifying Human Rights Courts.
5. The
State Governments shall take steps to install CCTV cameras in all the prisons
in their respective States, within a period of one year from today but not
later than two years.
6. The
State Governments shall also consider installation of CCTV cameras in police
stations in a phased manner depending upon the incidents of human rights
violation reported in such stations.
7. The
State Governments shall consider appointment of non-official visitors to
prisons and police stations in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act
wherever they exist in the Jail Manuals or the relevant Rules and Regulations.
8. The
State Governments shall launch in all cases where an enquiry establishes
culpability of the persons in whose custody the victim has suffered death or
injury, an appropriate prosecution for the commission of offences disclosed by
such enquiry report and/or investigation in accordance with law.
9. The
State Governments shall consider deployment of at least two women constables in
each police station wherever such deployment is considered necessary having
regard to the number of women taken for custodial interrogation or
interrogation for other purposes over the past two years.
32. These
petitions are, with the above directions, disposed of. Liberty is, however,
reserved to the petitioner to seek revival of these proceedings should there be
any cogent reason for such revival at any time in future. No costs.
………………………………….…..…J.
(T.S.
THAKUR) ………………………………….…..…J.
(R.
BANUMATHI) New Delhi;
24th
July, 2015.
ITEM
NO.1F-For Judgment COURT NO.2 SECTION PIL(W) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D
I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Crl.M.P. Nos. 16086/1997 in Crl.M.P. No. 4201/1997
with Crl.M.P. No. 4201/1997, 4105/1999, 2600/2000, 2601/2000, 480/2001, 3965,
10385/2002, 12704/2001, 19694/2010 in Crl.M.P. No. 4201/1997, Crl.M.P. No.
13566/2011 in Crl.M.P. No. 16086/1997 in Crl.M.P. No. 4201/1997, Crl.M.P. No.
15490/2014 in Writ Petition(s)(Criminal) No(s). 539/1986 SHRI DILIP K. BASU
Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. Respondent(s) Date :
24/07/2015 These petitions were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today.
For
Petitioner(s) Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal,Adv.
For
Respondent(s) Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv.
Mr. Anip
Sachthey,Adv.
Mr. Anil
K. Jha,Adv.
Mr. B.
Krishna Prasad,Adv.
Mr. G.
Prakash,Adv.
Mr. Gopal
Singh,Adv.
Mr.
Rituraj Biswas, Adv.
Mr.
Manish Kumar, Adv.
Mr.
Guntur Prabhakar,Adv.
Ms. Indra
Sawhney,Adv.
Mr.
Naresh K. Sharma,Adv.
Dr. A.M.
Singhvi, Sr. Adv.
Mr.
Pranab Kumar Mullick, Adv.
Mr. Amit
Bhandari, Adv.
Mrs. S.
Mullick, Adv.
Mr. Sebat
Kumar D., Adv.
Ms.
Sushma Suri,Adv.
Mr. T. C.
Sharma,Adv.
Mr. T. V.
Ratnam,Adv.
Mr.
Pravir Choudhary,Adv.
Mr. K. R.
Sasiprabhu,Adv.
Mr.
Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv.
Mr. D. S.
Mahra,Adv.
Mr.
Ranjan Mukherjee,Adv.
Mrs. D.
Bharathi Reddy,Adv.
Mr.
Khwairakpam Nobin Singh,Adv.
Ms. Asha
Gopalan Nair,Adv.
Mr.
Sanjay R. Hegde,Sr. Adv.
Mr. Gopal
Prasad,Adv.
Mr. Javed
Mahmud Rao,Adv.
Mr.
Abhijit Sengupta,Adv.
Mr.
Jayesh Gaurav, Adv.
Mr. Ratan
Kumar Choudhuri,Adv.
Ms. Bina
Madhavan,Adv.
For M/s
Corporate Law Group Mr. C. D. Singh,Adv.
Ms.
Sakshi Kakkar, Adv.
Mr.
Jatinder Kumar Bhatia,Adv.
Mr. P. V.
Yogeswaran,Adv.
Mr. P. V.
Dinesh,Adv.
Mr.
Shibashish Misra,Adv.
Mr. Ansar
Ahmad Chaudhary,Adv.
Mr. T.
Harish Kumar,Adv.
Mr.
Manish Kumar Saran,Adv.
Mr.
Anuvrat Sharma,Adv.
Mr.
Balaji Srinivasan,Adv.
Mr. Ajay
Pal,Adv.
Mr.
Suryanarayana Singh, Sr. AAG Ms. Pragati Neekhra,Adv.
Mr.
Gunnam Venkateswara Rao,Adv.
Ms. Ruchi
Kohli,Adv.
Mr. Sunil
Fernandes,Adv.
Mr. K.V.
Jagdishvaran, Adv.
Ms. G.
Indira,Adv.
Mr. M.
Yogesh Kanna,Adv.
Mr.
Jayant Patel, Adv.
Mr.
Chandra Prakash,Adv.
Mr. Sapam
Biswajit Meitei, Adv.
Mr. Z.H.
Isaac Haiding, Adv.
Mr. Ashok
Kumar Singh, Adv.
Mrs. K.
Enatoli Sema, Adv.
Mr.
Edward Belho, Adv.
Mr. Amit
Kumar Singh, Adv.
Ms. A.
Subhashini, Adv.
Hon'ble
Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His
Lordship and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.
The
petitions are disposed of in terms of the Signed Reportable Judgment with
following directions:
1. The
States of Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya,
Tripura and Nagaland shall within a period of six months from today set up
State Human Rights Commissions for their respective territories with or without
resort to provisions of Section 21(6) of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993.
2. All
vacancies, for the post of Chairperson or the Member of SHRC wherever they
exist at present shall be filled up by the State Governments concerned within a
period of three months from today.
3.
Vacancies occurring against the post of Chairperson or the Members of the SHRC
in future shall be filled up as expeditiously as possible but not later than
three months from the date such vacancy occurs.
4. The
State Governments shall take appropriate action in terms of Section 30 of the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993, in regard to setting up/specifying Human Rights Courts.
5. The
State Governments shall take steps to install CCTV cameras in all the prisons
in their respective States, within a period of one year from today but not
later than two years.
6. The
State Governments shall also consider installation of CCTV cameras in police
stations in a phased manner depending upon the incidents of human rights
violation reported in such stations.
7. The
State Governments shall consider appointment of non-official visitors to
prisons and police stations in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act
wherever they exist in the Jail Manuals or the relevant Rules and Regulations.
8. The
State Governments shall launch in all cases where an enquiry establishes
culpability of the persons in whose custody the victim has suffered death or
injury, an appropriate prosecution for the commission of offences disclosed by
such enquiry report and/or investigation in accordance with law.
9. The
State Governments shall consider deployment of at least two women constables in
each police station wherever such deployment is considered necessary having
regard to the number of women taken for custodial interrogation or interrogation
for other purposes over the past two years.
(VINOD KR.JHA) (VEENA KHERA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed
Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1] (1997) 1 SCC 416
[2] (1994) 4 SCC 260
[3] (1993) 2 SCC 746
[4] (1995) 4 SCC 262
[5] (1997) 6 SCC 642
[6] (1998) 9 SCC 437
[7] (1998) 6 SCC 380
[8] (2002) 10 SCC 741
[9] (2003) 11 SCC 723
[10] (2003) 11 SCC 725
[11] (2003) 12 SCC 174
[12] (1880) 5 AC 214
[13] AIR 1965 SC 1222
[14] (1977) 2 SCC 166
[15] (2004) 9 SCC 362
[16] (1997) 7 SCC 622
[17] (2008) 12 SCC 372
[18] (2012) 2 SCC 688
