Alister Anthony Pareira vs State Of Maharashtra on 12 January, 2012
Section 304, 279, 336, 337, 338 and 427 IPC;
Section
185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section
66 (1)(b) of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949.
Bench: R.M.
Lodha, Jagdish Singh Khehar
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1318-1320 OF 2007
Alister Anthony Pareira ...Appellant
Versus
State of Maharashtra ...Respondent
JUDGEMENT
R.M. LODHA, J.
On the South-North Road at the East side of Carter
Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai in the early hours of November 12, 2006 between
3.45 - 4.00 a.m., a car ran into the pavement killing seven persons and causing
injuries to eight persons. The appellant - Alister Anthony Pareira - was at the
wheels. He has been convicted by the High Court for the offences punishable
under Sections 304 Part II, 338 and 337 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
2. The prosecution case against the appellant is
this: the repair and construction work of the Carter Road, Bandra (West) at the
relevant time was being carried out by New India Construction Company. The
labourers were engaged by the construction company for executing the works. The
temporary sheds (huts) were put up for the residence of labourers on the
pavement. In the night of November 11, 2006 and November 12, 2006, the laborers
were asleep in front of their huts on the pavement. Between 3.45 to 4.00 a.m.,
that night, the appellant while driving the car (corolla) bearing Registration
No. MH-01-R-580 rashly and negligently with knowledge that people were asleep
on footpath rammed the car over the pavement; caused death of seven persons and
injuries to eight persons. At the time of incident, the appellant was
found to have consumed alcohol. A liquor bottle was recovered from the
appellant's car. On his medical examination, he was found to have 0.112% w/v
liquor (ethyl alcohol) in his blood. The appellant was fully familiar with the
area being the resident of Carter Road.
3. The contractor--Panchanadan Paramalai Harijan
(PW-2) - who had engaged the labourers and witnessed the incident reported the
matter immediately to the Khar Police Station. His statement (Ex. 13) was
recorded and based on that a first information report (No. 838) was registered
under Section
304, 279, 336, 337, 338 and 427 IPC;Section
185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 andSection
66 (1)(b) of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949.
4. On completion of investigation, the charge sheet
was submitted against the appellant by the Investigating Officer in the court
of Magistrate having jurisdiction. The appellant was committed to the
Court of Sessions and was tried by 2nd Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge,
Sewree, Mumbai.
5. The indictment of the appellant was on two
charges. The two charges read:-
"(i) that on November 12, 2006 between 3.45 to
4.00 a.m. you have driven the car bearing No. MH-01-R-580 rashly and
negligently with knowledge that people are sleeping on footpath and likely to
cause death of those persons slept over footpath and thereby caused the death
of seven persons who were sleeping on footpath on Carter Road and thereby
committed an offence punishable underSection
304 Part II IPC.
(ii) on above date, time and place you have driven
the vehicle in rashly and negligent manner and thereby caused grievous injury
to seven persons who were sleeping on footpath and thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 338 IPC."
6. The prosecution, to prove the above charges
against the appellant, tendered oral as well as documentary evidence. In all,
18 witnesses, namely, Dr. Nitin Vishnu Barve (PW-1), Panchanadan
Paramalai Harijan (PW-2), Ramchandra Chakrawarti (PW-3), Pindi Ramu
(PW-4), Sriniwas Raman Pindi (PW-5), Smt. Mariamma Shingamana (PW-6), Smt.
Prema Chingaram (PW-7), Jagan Singaram (PW-8), Sigamani Shankar Pani (PW-9),
Mallikarjun Bajappa Motermallappa (PW-10), J.C. Cell Mendosa (PW-11), Praveen
Sajjan Mohite (PW-
12), Limbaji Samadhan Ingle (PW-13), Dr. Sharad
Maniklal Ruia (PW-14), Rajendra Nilkanth Sawant (PW-15), Basraj Sanjeev Mehetri
(PW-16), Meenakshi Anant Gondapatil (PW-17) and Somnath Baburam Phulsunder
(PW-18) were examined. The complaint, spot panchnama along with sketch map,
C.A. Reports and other documents were also proved.
7. The statement of the appellant under Section
313of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short,
`the Code') was recorded. He admitted that he was driving the car no.
MH-01-R-580 at the relevant time and the accident did occur but his explanation
was that it happened on account of failure of engine and mechanical
defect in the car and there was no negligence or rashness on his part.
8. The 2nd Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Sewree,
Mumbai, on April 13, 2007 convicted the appellant for the offences punishable
underSections
304A and 337 IPC.
The court sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment of six months with fine
of Rs. 5 lakhs for the offence underSection
304A IPC and in default further suffer simple
imprisonment of one month and simple imprisonment of 15 days for the offence
under Section 337 IPC. Both
the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
9. On April 19, 2007, the Bombay High Court took
suo motu cognizance of the judgment and order dated April 13, 2007 passed by
the 2nd Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Sewree and issued notice to the State
of Maharashtra, the appellant and to the heirs of the deceased and also to the
injured persons.
10. The State of Maharashtra preferred criminal
appeal (No. 566 of 2007) under Section
378(3) of the Code challenging the acquittal of the
appellant under Sections 304 Part II and 338 IPC.
Another criminal appeal (No. 430 of 2007) was also preferred by the State of
Maharashtra seeking enhancement of sentence awarded to the appellant for the
offence under Section 304A and Section
337IPC by the trial court.
11. The appellant also preferred criminal appeal
(No. 475/2007) for setting aside the judgment and order dated April 13, 2007
passed by the trial court convicting him under Section
304A and Section
337IPC and the sentence awarded to him by the trial
court.
12. All these matters were heard together by the
High Court and have been disposed of by the common judgment on September 6,
2007. The High Court set aside the acquittal of the appellant underSection
304 IPC and convicted him for the offences under
Section 304 Part II, Section 338 and Section
337 IPC. The High Court sentenced the
appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence
punishable under Section 304 Part II
IPC with a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs.
On account of offence under Section
338 IPC, the appellant was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and for the offence under Section
337 IPC rigorous imprisonment for six months. The
High Court noted that fine amount as per the order of the trial court had
already been distributed to the families of victims.
13. It is from the above judgment of the High Court
that the present appeals have been preferred by the appellant.
14. A great deal of argument in the hearing of the
appeals turned on the indictment of the appellant on the two charges, namely,
the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC and the offence punishable
under Section 338 IPC and
his conviction for the above offences and also under Section
337 IPC. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior
counsel for the appellant argued that this was legally impermissible as the
charges under Section 304 Part II
IPC and Section 338 IPC were
mutually destructive and the two charges under these Sections cannot co-exist.
His submission was that the appellant was charged for the above offences for
committing a single act i.e., rash or negligent for causing injuries to eight
persons and at the same time committed with knowledge resulting in death of
seven persons which is irreconcilable and moreover that has caused grave
prejudice to the appellant resulting in failure of justice.
15. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel also
argued that no question was put to the appellant in his statement under Section
313 of the Code about his drunken condition or
that he was under the influence of alcohol and, thus, had knowledge that his
act was likely to result in causing death. CA Report (Ex. 49) that blood and
urine of the appellant had alcohol content and the evidence of PW-1 that he
found the appellant in drunken condition and his blood sample was taken
were also not put to the appellant. These incriminating evidences, learned
senior counsel submitted, cannot form basis of conviction. The conclusion
arrived at by the Investigating Officers (PW-17 and PW-18) regarding drunken
condition of the appellant which was put to the appellant in his statement
under Section
313 of the Code was of no legal use. Moreover,
PW-17 and PW-18 have not deposed before the court that the appellant was found
in drunken condition much less under the influence of liquor.
Learned senior counsel would thus submit that the
sole basis of the appellant's conviction underSection
304 Part-II IPC that the appellant had knowledge
that his reckless and negligent driving in a drunken condition could result in
serious consequences of causing a fatal accident cannot be held to have been
established. In this regard, learned senior counsel relied upon two decisions
of this Court, namely, (i) Ghulam
Din Buch & Ors. v. State of J & K1 and
(ii) Kuldip Singh & Ors. v. State of Delhi2. 1
1996 (9) SCC 239 2 2003 (12) SCC 528
16. Mr. U.U. Lalit vehemently contended that no
charge was framed that the appellant had consumed alcohol. Moreover, he
submited that no reliance could be placed on C.A. Report (Ex. 49) as the evidence
does not satisfactorily establish that the samples were kept in safe custody
until they reached the CFSL. Moreover, no charge was framed by the court
against the appellant under Section
185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section
66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949.
17. Learned senior counsel argued that appellant's
conviction under Section 304A, 338 and 337 IPC
was not legally sustainable for more than one reason.
First, no charge under Section
304A IPC was framed against the appellant as he
was charged only under Section
304 Part II IPC and Section
338IPC which are not the offences of the same
category. In the absence of charge under Section
304A IPC, the appellant cannot be convicted for
the said offence being not a minor offence of Section
304 Part II IPC. The charge under Section
338 IPC does not help the prosecution as by
virtue of that charge the appellant cannot be convicted under Section
304A IPC being graver offence than Section
338 IPC. Secondly, the accident had occurred not
on account of rash or negligent act of the appellant but on account of failure
of the engine. He referred to the evidence of Rajendra Nilkanth Sawant (PW-15)
who deposed that he could not state if the accident took place due to
dislodging of right side wheel and dislodging of the engine from the
foundation. In the absence of any firm opinion by an expert as regards the
cause of accident, the possibility of the accident having occurred on account of
mechanical failure cannot be ruled out. Thirdly, in the absence of medical
certificate that the persons injured received grievous injuries, charge
under Section 338 IPC was
not established.
18. Learned senior counsel lastly submitted that in
case the charges against appellant are held to be proved, having regard to the
facts, namely, the age of the appellant at the time of the accident; the
appellant being the only member to support his family - mother and unmarried
sister - having lost his father during the pendency of the present appeals; the
fine and compensation of Rs. 8.5 lakhs having been paid and the sentence of two
months already undergone, the appellant may be released on probation of good
conduct and behavior or, in the alternative, the sentence may be reduced to the
period already undergone by the appellant.
19. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Kharde, learned
counsel for the State of Maharashtra stoutly defended the judgment of the High
Court. He argued that the fact that labourers were asleep on the footpath has
gone unchallenged by the defence. He would submit that the drunken condition of
the appellant is fully proved by the evidence of PW-1. Further, PW-1 has not at
all been cross-examined on this aspect. The recovery of liquor bottle is proved
by the evidence of spot panchas (PW-11 and PW-16). They have not been
cross examined in this regard. PW-17 collected blood sample of the appellant
from PW-1 and then PW-18 forwarded the blood sample to the chemical analyzer
along with the forwarding letter. The appellant has not challenged C.A. Report
(Ex. 49) in the cross-examination of PW-18.
20. Learned counsel for the State submitted that
the involvement of the appellant in the incident has been fully established by
the evidence of PW-13 who was an eye-witness and working as a watchman at
construction site. Moreover, the appellant was apprehended immediately after
the incident. There is no denial by the appellant about occurrence of the
accident. The defence of the appellant was that the accident happened due to
engine and mechanical failure but the appellant has failed to probablise his
defence. He referred to the evidence of PW-15 - motor vehicle inspector - to
show that the brake and the gear of the car were operative.
21. Learned counsel for the State referred to the
evidence of injured witnesses and also the evidence of PW-12 and PW-14 who
issued medical certificates and submitted that the prosecution has established
beyond reasonable doubt that the knowledge was attributable to the accused as
he was driving the car in a drunken condition at a high speed. The accused had
the knowledge, as he was resident of the same area, that the labourers sleep at
the place of occurrence. Learned counsel submitted that the evidence on record
and the attendant circumstances justify attributability of actual knowledge to
the appellant and the High Court rightly held so. In this regard, the learned
counsel for the State placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court in Jai
Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration)3 and Joti Parshad v. State of Haryana4. He disputed
that there was any error in the framing of charge. He would contend that in any
case an error or omission in framing of charge or irregularity in the charge
does not invalidate the 3 1991 (2) SCC 32 4 1993 Supp (2) SCC 497
conviction of an accused. The omission about the drunken condition of the
accused in the charge at best can be said to be an irregularity but that does
not affect the conviction. In this regard, he relied upon Section
464 of the Code and the decisions of this Court
in Willie
(William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh5, Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P.6 and Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy and others v. State of Andhra
Pradesh7.
22. Mr. Sanjay Kharde submitted that by not putting
C.A. Report (Ex. 49) to the appellant in his statement under Section
313 of the Code, no prejudice has been caused to
him as he admitted in his statement under Section
313 of the Code that he was fully aware about the
statement of the witnesses and exhibits on record. In this regard, learned
counsel relied upon decision of this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and another v. State of
Maharashtra8 .
5 AIR 1956 SC 116 6 2004 (5) SCC 334 7 2009 (12)
SCC 546 8 1973 (2) SCC 793
23. Lastly, learned counsel for the State submitted
that the circumstances pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the
appellant do not justify the benefit of probation to the appellant or reduction
of the sentence to the period already undergone. He submitted that seven
innocent persons lost their lives and eight persons got injured due to the act
of the appellant and, therefore, no sympathy was called for. He submitted that
sentence should be proportionate to the gravity of offence. He relied upon the
decisions of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. Krishnappa9, Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana10, Shailesh Jasvantbhai and another v. State of Gujarat and
others11 and Manish Jalan v. State of Karnataka12.
24. On
the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the counsel
for the respondent, the following questions arise for our consideration:
9 2000 (4) SCC 75 10 2000 (5) SCC 82 11 2006 (2)
SCC 359 12 2008 (8) SCC 225
(i) Whether indictment on the two charges, namely,
the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC and the offence punishable
under Section 338IPC is mutually
destructive and legally impermissible? In other words, whether it is
permissible to try and convict a person for the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC and the offence punishable
under Section 338 IPC for a
single act of the same transaction?
(ii) Whether by not charging the appellant of
`drunken condition' and not putting to him the entire incriminating evidence
let in by the prosecution, particularly the evidence relating to appellant's
drunken condition, at the time of his examination under Section
313 of the Code, the trial and conviction of the
appellant got affected?
(iii) Whether prosecution evidence establishes
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the offences by the appellant under
Section 304 Part II,IPC, Section
338 IPC and Section
337 IPC?
(iv) Whether sentence awarded to the appellant by
the High Court for the offence punishable underSection
304 Part II IPC requires any modification?
re: question (i)
25. Section
304 IPC provides for punishment for culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. It reads as under:
"S.304. - Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder - Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder
shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable
to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that
it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to
cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death".
26. The above Section is in two parts. Although
Section does not specify Part I and Part II but for the sake of convenience,
the investigators, the prosecutors, the lawyers, the judges and the authors
refer to the first paragraph of the Section as Part I while the second
paragraph is referred to as Part II. The constituent elements of Part I and
Part II are different and, consequently, the difference in punishment. For punishment
under Section 304 Part I, the prosecution must prove: the death of the
person in question; that such death was caused by the act of the accused and
that the accused intended by such act to cause death or cause such bodily
injury as was likely to cause death. As regards punishment for Section 304 Part
II, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question; that such
death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of
his was likely to cause death. In order to find out that an offence is
`culpable homicide not amounting to murder' - since Section
304 does not define this expression - Sections
299 and 300 IPC
have to be seen. Section 299 IPC reads
as under:
"S.-299. - Culpable homicide.--Whoever causes
death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with
the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence
of culpable homicide."
27. To constitute the offence of culpable homicide
as defined in Section 299 the death
must be caused by doing an act: (a) with the intention of causing death, or
(b) with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, or (c) with the knowledge that the doer is
likely by such act to cause death.
28. Section
300 deals with murder and also provides for
exceptions. The culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is
caused is done: (1) with the intention of causing death, (2) with the intention
of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the
death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or (3) with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, or (4) with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as aforesaid. The exceptions provide that the
culpable homicide will not be murder if that act is done with the intention or
knowledge in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified
therein. In other words, the culpable homicide is not murder if the act by
which death is caused is done in extenuating circumstances and such act is
covered by one of the five exceptions set out in the later part of Section
300.
29. It is not necessary in the present matter to
analyse Section 299 and Section
300 in detail. Suffice it to say that the last
clause of Section 299and clause
`fourthly' of Section 300 are based
on the knowledge of the likely or probable consequences of the act and do not
connote any intention at all.
30. Reference to few other provisions of IPC in
this regard is also necessary. Section
279 makes rash driving or riding on a public way
so as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
other person an offence and provides for punishment which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/-, or with both.
"S.304A. - Causing death by negligence.--
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not
amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with
both."
32. Section
336 IPC says that whoever does any act so rashly
or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 250/-, or with
both.
"S. 337. - Causing hurt by act endangering
life or personal safety of others.--Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing
any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal
safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five
hundred rupees, or with both."
"S. 338. - Causing grievous hurt by act
endangering life or personal safety of others.
--Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by
doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the
personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
35. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg13, Straight J.,
explained the meaning of criminal rashness and criminal negligence in the
following words: criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with
the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury but without intention
to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality
lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference
as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect
or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard
against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in
particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the
charge has arisen, it was 13 1881 (3) All 776 the imperative duty of the
accused person to have adopted.
36. The
above meaning of criminal rashness and criminal negligence given by Straight J.
has been adopted consistently by this Court.
37. Insofar as Section
304A IPC is concerned, it deals with death caused
by doing any rash or negligent act where such death is caused neither
intentionally nor with the knowledge that the act of the offender is likely to
cause death. The applicability of Section
304A IPC is limited to rash or negligent acts
which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide amounting to murder or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. An essential element to
attract Section 304A IPC is
death caused due to rash or negligent act. The three things which are required
to be proved for an offence under Section
304A are : (1) death of human being; (2) the
accused caused the death and (3) the death was caused by the doing of a
rash or negligent act, though it did not amount to culpable homicide of either
description.
38. Like Section
304A, Sections
279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC
are attracted for only the negligent or rash act.
39. The scheme of Sections
279, 304A, 336, 337 and338 leaves
no manner of doubt that these offences are punished because of the inherent
danger of the acts specified therein irrespective of knowledge or intention to
produce the result and irrespective of the result. These sections make
punishable the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to
human life. The question is whether indictment of an accused under Section 304
Part II and Section 338 IPC can co-exist
in a case of single rash or negligent act. We think it can. We do not think
that two charges are mutually destructive. If the act is done with the
knowledge of the dangerous consequences which are likely to follow and if death
is caused then not only that the punishment is for the act but also for
the resulting homicide and a case may fall within Section
299 orSection
300 depending upon the mental state of the
accused viz., as to whether the act was done with one kind of knowledge or the
other or the intention. Knowledge is awareness on the part of the person
concerned of the consequences of his act of omission or commission indicating
his state of mind.
There may be knowledge of likely consequences
without any intention. Criminal culpability is determined by referring to what
a person with reasonable prudence would have known.
40. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with
the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and
resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a
risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs,
may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter
of law - in view of the provisions of the IPC -
the cases which fall within last clause of Section
299 but not within clause `fourthly' of Section
300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent act
done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and may
entail punishment under Section
304 Part II IPC. Section
304A IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of death
of any person by doing any rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide
of either description.
41. A person, responsible for a reckless or rash or
negligent act that causes death which he had knowledge as a reasonable man that
such act was dangerous enough to lead to some untoward thing and the death was
likely to be caused, may be attributed with the knowledge of the consequence
and may be fastened with culpability of homicide not amounting to murder and
punishable under Section 304 Part II
IPC.
42. There is no incongruity, if simultaneous with
the offence under Section 304 Part II, a person who has done an act so
rashly or negligently endangering human life or the personal safety of the
others and causes grievous hurt to any person is tried for the offence
under Section 338 IPC.
43. In view of the above, in our opinion there is
no impediment in law for an offender being charged for the offence under Section
304 Part II IPC and also under Sections
337 and 338 IPC.
The two charges under Section 304 Part II
IPC and Section 338 IPC can
legally co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act where a rash or
negligent act is done with the knowledge of likelihood of its dangerous consequences.
which is legally permissible - no prejudice has
been caused to him. The appellant was made fully aware of the charges against
him and there is no failure of justice.
We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission
of Mr. U.U. Lalit that by charging the appellant for the offences
under Section
304 Part II IPC and Section
338 IPC for a rash or negligent act resulting in
injuries to eight persons and at the same time committed with the knowledge
resulting in death of seven persons, the appellant has been asked to face
legally impermissible course.
45. In Prabhakaran Vs. State of Kerala14, this
Court was concerned with the appeal filed by a convict who was found guilty of
the offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC. In that case, the bus driven by
the convict ran over a boy aged 10 years. The prosecution case was that bus was
being driven by the appellant therein at the enormous speed and although the
passengers had cautioned the driver to stop as they had seen children crossing
the road in a queue, the driver ran over the student on his head. It was
alleged that the driver had real intention to cause death of persons to whom
harm may be caused on the bus hitting them. He was charged with offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC. The
Trial Court found that no 14 2007 (14) SCC 269 intention had been proved
in the case but at the same time the accused acted with the knowledge that it
was likely to cause death, and, therefore, convicted the accused of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- with a
default sentence of imprisonment for three years. The High Court dismissed the
appeal and the matter reached this Court. While observing that Section
304A speaks of causing death by negligence and
applies to rash and negligent acts and does not apply to cases where there is
an intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will in all probability
cause death and that Section 304A only
applies to cases in which without any such intention or knowledge death is
caused by a rash and negligent act, on the factual scenario of the case, it was
held that the appropriate conviction would be under Section
304A IPC and not Section
304 Part II IPC. Prabhakaran14 does not say
in absolute terms that in no case of an automobile accident that results in
death of a person due to rash and negligent act of the driver, the conviction
can be maintained for the offence under Section
304 Part II IPC even if such act (rash or
negligent) was done with the knowledge that by such act of his, death was
likely to be caused. Prabhakaran14 turned on its own facts. Each case obviously
has to be decided on its own facts. In a case where negligence or rashness is
the cause of death and nothing more, Section
304A may be attracted but where the rash or
negligent act is preceded with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause
death, Section 304 Part II
IPC may be attracted and if such a rash and negligent act is preceded by real
intention on the part of the wrong doer to cause death, offence may be
punishable under Section 302 IPC.
re: question (ii)
46. On behalf of the appellant it was strenuously
urged that the conviction of the appellant by the High Court for the
offence under Section 304 Part II
IPC rests solely on the premise that the appellant had knowledge that his
reckless or negligent driving in a drunken condition could result in serious
consequences of causing fatal accident . It was submitted that neither in the
charge framed against the appellant, the crux of the prosecution case that the
appellant was in a drunken condition was stated nor incriminating evidences and
circumstances relating to rashness or negligence of the accused in the drunken
condition were put to him in the statement under Section
313 of the Code.
47. It is a fact that no charge under Section
185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section
66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 was framed against the appellant.
It is also a fact that in the charge framed against the appellant under Section
304 Part II IPC, the words `drunken condition'
are not stated and the charge reads; `on November 12, 2006 between 3.45 to 4.00
a.m. he was driving the car bearing Registration No. MH-01-R-580 rashly
and negligently with knowledge that people are sleeping on footpath and likely
to cause death of those persons rammed over the footpath and thereby caused death
of 8 persons who were sleeping on footpath on Carter Road, Bandra (West),
Mumbai and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC'. The question is whether the omission
of the words, `in drunken condition' after the words `negligently' and before
the words `with knowledge' has caused any prejudice to the appellant.
"S.464. - Effect of omission to frame, or
absence of, or error in, charge.-
(1) No finding sentence or order by a court of
competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no
charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in
the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the
court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact
been occasioned thereby. (2) If the court of appeal, confirmation or revision
is of opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned, it may-
(a) In the case of an omission to frame a charge,
order that a charge be framed and that the trial be recommenced from the point
immediately after the framing of the charge.
(b) In the case of an error, omission or
irregularity in the charge, direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed
in whatever manner it thinks fit:
Provided that if the court is of opinion that the
facts of the case are such that no valid charge could be preferred against the
accused in respect of the facts proved, it shall quash the conviction.
49. The above provision has come up for
consideration before this Court on numerous occasions.
It is not necessary to refer to all these
decisions.
Reference to a later decision of this Court in the
case of Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy7 delivered by one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.)
shall suffice. In paras 55-56 of the Report in Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy7 it
has been stated as follows:
"55. In unmistakable terms, Section
464 specifies that a finding or sentence of a
court shall not be set aside merely on the ground that a charge was not framed
or that charge was defective unless it has occasioned in prejudice. Because of
a mere defect in language or in the narration or in form of the charge,
the conviction would not be rendered bad if accused has not been adversely
affected thereby. If the ingredients of the section are obvious or implicit,
conviction in regard thereto can be sustained irrespective of the fact that the
said section has not been mentioned.
56. A fair trial to the accused is a sine quo non
in our criminal justice system but at the same time procedural law contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure is designed to further
the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by introduction of hyper-
technicalities. Every case must depend on its own merits and no straightjacket
formula can be applied; the essential and important aspect to be kept in mind
is: has omission to frame a specific charge resulted in prejudice to the
accused."
50. In light of the above legal position, if the
charge under Section 304 Part II
IPC framed against the appellant is seen, it would be clear that the
ingredients of Section 304 Part II
IPC are implicit in that charge.
The omission of the words `in drunken condition' in
the charge is not very material and, in any case, such omission has not at all
resulted in prejudice to the appellant as he was fully aware of the
prosecution evidence which consisted of drunken condition of the
appellant at the time of incident.
51. PW-1 is the doctor who examined the appellant
immediately after the incident. In his deposition he stated that he had taken
the blood of the accused as he was found in drunken condition. On behalf of the
appellant PW-1 has been cross examined but there is no cross-examination of
PW-1 on this aspect.
52. It is a fact that evidence of PW-1, as noticed
above, has not been put to the appellant in his statement under Section
313 of the Code but that pales into
insignificance for want of cross examination of PW-1 in regard to his
deposition that the appellant was found in drunken condition and his blood
sample was taken.
53. CA Report (Ex. 49) too has not been
specifically put to the appellant at the time of his examination under Section
313 of the Code but it is pertinent to notice
that PW-18 (Investigating Officer) deposed that he had forwarded blood
sample of the accused and the bottle found in the car to the chemical analyzer
(CA) on 14.11.2006 and 15.11.2006 respectively. He further deposed that he
collected the medical certificate from Bhabha Hospital and he had received the
CA report (Ex. 49). PW-18 has also not been cross examined by the defence in
respect of the above. In the examination underSection
313 of the Code the following questions were put
to the appellant: Question 9: "What you want to say about the further
evidence of above two witnesses that police while drawing spot panchanama
seized one ladies chappal, remote, lighter, cigarette perfume and so called
liquor bottle from the vehicle i.e. MH-01-R-580?" The appellant answered
`I do not know' Question 16: " What you want to say about the evidence of
Meenakashi Patil who has stated that initial investigation as carried out by
her and further investigation was entrusted to PI Phulsunder from 13.11.2006
and on due investigation police concluded themselves that your rash and
negligence driving caused the death of seven persons and injury to the eight
persons by vehicle No. MH-01-R-580 by consuming alcohol so police have charge
sheeted you?" He answered, `It is false'.
54. The above questions in his examination under Section
313 of the Code show that the appellant was fully
aware of the prosecution evidence relating to his rash and negligent driving in
the drunken condition. In the circumstances, by not putting to the appellant
expressly the CA report (Ex. 49) and the evidence of PW 1, no prejudice can be
said to have been caused to the appellant. The words of P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.
(as he then was) in Jai Dev Vs. State of Punjab15 speaking for three-Judge
Bench with reference to Section
342 of the Code (corresponding to Section
313 of the 1973 Code) may be usefully quoted:
"21 . . . . . . the ultimate test in
determining whether or not the accused has been fairly 15 AIR 1963 SC 612
examined under Section 342 would be
to enquire whether, having regard to all the questions put to him, he did get
an opportunity to say what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution case
against him. If it appears that the examination of the accused person was
defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him, that would no doubt
be a serious infirmity. . . . . . . . .".
55. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. Vs. State
of Maharashtra8 a 3-Judge Bench of this Court stated:
"16. ........It is trite law, nevertheless
fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory
material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a
criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of
the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However,
where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the
proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the
accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the
court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open
to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what
explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against
him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate
court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court
may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had
been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been
able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the
trial court had relied for its conviction".
56. The above decisions have been referred in Asraf
Ali Vs. State of Assam16. The Court stated:
"21. Section
313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put
in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him
to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It
follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance
appearing in the evidence against the accused is required to be put to him
specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a
serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was
prejudiced.
22. The object of Section
313 of the Code is to establish a direct dialogue
between the court and the accused. If a point in the evidence is important
against the accused, and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is
right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be
given an opportunity of explaining it. Where no specific question has been put
by the trial court on an inculpatory material in the prosecution evidence, it
would vitiate the trial. Of course, all these are subject to rider whether they
have caused miscarriage of justice or prejudice.
24. In certain cases when there is perfunctory
examination under Section 313 of the
Code, the matter is remanded to the trial court, with a direction to retry from
the stage at which the prosecution was closed".
16 2008 (16) SCC 328
57. From the above, the legal position appears to
be this : the accused must be apprised of incriminating evidence and materials
brought in by the prosecution against him to enable him to explain and respond
to such evidence and material. Failure in not drawing the attention of the
accused to the incriminating evidence and inculpatory materials brought in by
prosecution specifically, distinctly and separately may not by itself render
the trial against the accused void and bad in law;
firstly, if having regard to all the questions put
to him, he was afforded an opportunity to explain what he wanted to say in
respect of prosecution case against him and secondly, such omission has not
caused prejudice to him resulting in failure of justice. The burden is on the
accused to establish that by not apprising him of the incriminating evidence
and the inculpatory materials that had come in the prosecution evidence against
him, a prejudice has been caused resulting in miscarriage of justice.
58. Insofar as present case is concerned, in his
statement under Section 313, the appellant
was informed about the evidence relating to the incident that occurred in the
early hours (between 3.45 a.m. to 4.00 a.m.) of November 12, 2006 and the fact
that repairs were going on the road at that time. The appellant accepted this
position. The appellant was also informed about the evidence of the prosecution
that vehicle No. MH-01-R-580 was involved in the said incident. This was also
accepted by the appellant. His attention was brought to the evidence of the
eye-witnesses and injured witnesses, namely, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-
7, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 that at the relevant time
they were sleeping on the pavement of Carter Road, Bandra (West) outside the
temporary huts and there was an accident in which seven persons died and eight
persons got injured. The attention of the appellant was also drawn to the
evidence of the spot panchas (PW-11 and PW-16) that they had noticed that
the car no. MH-01-R-
580 at the time of preparation of spot panchnama
was in a heavily damaged condition with dislodged right side wheel and some
blood was found on the earth and the huts were found damaged. The prosecution
evidence that the appellant was seen driving car no. MH-01-R-580 at high speed
from Khar Danda side and that rammed over the footpath and crushed the
labourers sleeping there was also brought to his notice. The evidence of the
mechanical expert (PW-15) that he checked the vehicle and found no mechanical
defect in the car was also brought to his notice. During investigation, the
police concluded that the rash and negligent driving of the appellant by
consuming alcohol caused the death of seven persons and injury to the eight
persons. The conclusion drawn on the completion of investigation was also put
to him. The appellant's attention was also invited to the materials such as
photographs, mechanical inspections of the car, seized articles, liquor bottle,
etc. Having regard to the above, it cannot be said that the appellant was
not made fully aware of the prosecution evidence that he had driven the car
rashly or negligently in a drunken condition. He had full opportunity to say
what he wanted to say with regard to the prosecution evidence.
59. The High Court in this regard held as under :
"29............The salutary provision of section
313 of the Code have been fairly, or at least
substantially, complied with by the trial court, in the facts and circumstances
of this case. The real purpose of putting the accused at notice of the
incriminating circumstances and requiring him to offer explanation, if he so
desires, has been fully satisfied in the present case. During the entire trial,
copies of the documents were apparently supplied to the accused, even prior to
the framing of the charge. After such charge was framed, all the witnesses were
examined in the presence of the accused and even limited questions regarding
incriminating material put by the court to the accused in his statement
under Section
313 of the Code shows that the entire prosecution
case along with different exhibits was put to the accused. He in fact did not
deny the suggestions that the witnesses had been examined in his presence and
he was aware about the contents of their statements. All this essentially
would lead to only one conclusion that the contention raised on behalf of the
accused in this regard deserves to be rejected. While rejecting this contention
we would also observe that the admission or confession of the accused in his
statement under section 313 of the
Code, in so far as it provides support or even links to, or aids the case of
the prosecution proved on record, can also be looked into by the court in
arriving at its final conclusion. It will be more so when explanation in the
form of answers given by the accused under Section
313 of the Code are apparently untrue and also
when no cross examination of the crucial prosecution witnesses was conducted on
this line."
We are in agreement with the above view of the High
Court.
r e: question (iii )
60. The crucial question now remains to be seen is
whether the prosecution evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of offence under Section
304 Part II IPC, Section
338IPC and Section
337 IPC against the appellant.
61. The appellant has not denied that in the early
hours of November 12, 2006 between 3.45-4.00 a.m. on the South-North Road at
the East side of Carter Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai, the car bearing
registration no. MH-01-R-580 met with an accident and he was at the wheels at
that time. PW-13 was working as a watchman at the construction site. He
witnessed the accident. He deposed that he noticed that in the night of
November 11, 2006 and November 12, 2006 at about 4.00 a.m., the vehicle bearing
no. MH-01-R-580 came from Khar Danda side; the vehicle was in high speed and
rammed over the pavement and crushed the labourers. He deposed that 14-15
persons were sleeping at that time on the pavement. He stated that he used to
take rounds during his duty hours. His evidence has not at all been shaken in
the cross-examination.
62. PW-2 is the complainant. He lodged the
complaint of the incident at the Khar Police Station. In his deposition, he has
stated that he was contractor with New India Construction Co. and nine
labourers were working under him. At Carter Road, the work of road levelling
was going on. He and other persons were sleeping in a temporary hutment
near railway colony.
The labourers were sleeping on the pavement. When
he was easing himself, at about 3.30 a.m. of November 12, 2006, he heard the
commotion and saw the smoke coming out of the vehicle that rammed over the
footpath.
Six persons died on the spot; one expired in the
hospital and eight persons sustained injuries. He confirmed that the police
recorded his complaint and the complaint (Ex.
13) was read over to him by the police and was
correct.
He has been cross-examined by the defence but there
is no cross examination in respect of his statement that he had got up to ease
himself at about 3.30 a.m. on November 12, 2006 and he heard the commotion and
saw smoke coming out of the vehicle. He has denied the suggestion of the
defence that road was blocked to some extent for construction purpose. He
denied that he had filed false complaint so as to avoid payment of compensation
to the workers.
63. The first Investigating Officer (PW-17), who
proceeded along with the staff no sooner the message was received from Khar 1
Mobile Van that accident had taken place at Carter Road, near Railway Officers
Quarters and reached the spot, has deposed that on her arrival at the spot, she
came to know that the labourers who were sleeping on footpath were run over by
the vehicle bearing No. MH-01-R-580. She shifted the injured to the Bhabha
Hospital; went to the Khar police station for recording the complaint and then
came back to the site of accident and prepared Panchnama (Ex. 28) in the
presence of Panchas PW-11 and PW-16. Exhibit 28 shows that the accident spot is
towards south of railway quarters gate and is at a distance of about 110 feet.
The length of footpath between railway quarters gate and Varun Co-operative
Housing Society gate is about 160 feet. The accident spot is about 50 feet from
the Varun Co-operative Housing Society gate. On the footpath, between railway
quarters gate and Varun Co-operative Housing Society gate, the temporary
sheds were set up.
The vehicle (Toyota Corolla) bearing No.
MH-01-R-580 was lying in the middle of the road between road divider and
footpath on Carter Road at about 50 feet from the north side of Varun
Co-operative Housing Society gate and about 110 feet from railway quarters gate
on the south side. The front wheel of the car was broken and mudguard was
pressed. The spot panchnama shows 70 feet long brake marks in a curve from west
side of the road divider towards footpath on eastern side. It is further seen
from the spot panchnama that a tempo, mud digger and two trucks were parked on
the road between Railway Quarters gate and Varun Cooperative Housing Society gate
near the accident spot. The spot panchnama is duly proved by PW-11 and PW-16.
There is nothing in the cross-examination of these witnesses to doubt their
presence or veracity. The long brake marks in curve show that vehicle was being
driven by the appellant at the high speed; the appellant had lost control
of the speeding vehicle resulting in the accident and, consequently, seven
deaths and injury to eight persons.
64. PW-15 is a motor vehicle inspector. He deposed
that he was summoned by the control room to check the vehicle MH 01-R-580
involved in the accident.
At the time of inspection, right side wheel of the
vehicle was found dislodged from the body of the vehicle and the engine was
dislodged from the foundation; though the steering wheel was intact and brake
lever and gear lever were operative. There was no air in the front wheel of the
vehicle. He opined that accident might have happened on account of dash. He has
been briefly cross-examined and the only thing he said in the cross-examination
was that he could not say whether the accident took place due to dislodging of
right side wheel and dislodging of engine from foundation.
65. The above evidence has been considered by the
High Court quite extensively. The High Court, on consideration of the entire
prosecution evidence and having regard to the deficiencies pointed out by the
defence, reached the conclusion that (1) the accused at the time of driving the
car was under the influence of liquor; (2) he drove the car in drunken
condition at a very high speed; and (3) he failed to control the vehicle and
the vehicle could not be stopped before it ran over the people sleeping on the
pavement. The High Court observed that the accused could not concentrate on
driving as he was under the influence of liquor and the vehicle was being
driven with loud noise and a tape recorder being played in high volume. The
High Court held that the accused had more than 22 feet wide road for driving
and there was no occasion for a driver to swing to the left and cover a distance
of more than 55 feet; climb over the footpath and run over the persons sleeping
on the footpath. The High Court took judicial notice of the fact that in Mumbai
people do sleep on pavements. The accused was also aware of the fact that
at the place of occurrence people sleep as the accused was resident of that
area. The High Court took note of the fact that the accused had admitted the
accident and his explanation was that the accident occurred due to mechanical
failure and the defect that was developed in the vehicle but found his
explanation improbable and unacceptable. The High Court also observed that the
factum of high and reckless speed was evident from the brake marks at the site.
The speeding car could not be stopped by him instantaneously. In the backdrop
of the above findings, the High Court held that the accused could be attributed
to have a specific knowledge of the event that happened. The High Court, thus
concluded that the accused had knowledge and in any case such knowledge would
be attributable to him that his actions were dangerous or wanton enough to
cause injuries which may even result into death of persons.
66. We have also carefully considered the evidence
let in by prosecution - the substance of which has been referred to above
- and we find no justifiable ground to take a view different from that of the
High Court. We agree with the conclusions of the High Court and have no
hesitation in holding that the evidence and materials on record prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant can be attributed with knowledge that his
act of driving the vehicle at a high speed in the rash or negligent manner was
dangerous enough and he knew that one result would very likely be that people
who were asleep on the pavement may be hit, should the vehicle go out of
control. There is a presumption that a man knows the natural and likely
consequences of his acts. Moreover, an act does not become involuntary act
simply because its consequences were unforeseen. The cases of negligence or of
rashness or dangerous driving do not eliminate the act being voluntary. In the
present case, the essential ingredients of Section
304 Part II IPC have been successfully
established by the prosecution against the appellant. The infirmities pointed
out by Mr. U.U.
Lalit, learned senior counsel for the appellant,
which have been noticed above are not substantial and in no way affect the
legality of the trial and the conviction of the appellant under Section
304 Part II IPC. We uphold the view of the High
Court being consistent with the evidence on record and law.
67. The trial court convicted the accused of the
offence under Section 337 IPC but
acquitted him of the charge under Section
338 IPC. The High Court noticed that two injured
persons, namely, PW-6 and PW-8 had injuries over the right front temporal
parietal region of the size of 5x3 cms. with scar deep with bleeding (Ex. 37
and 33 respectively). The High Court held that these were not simple injuries
and were covered by the grievous hurt under Section
320 IPC. We agree. Charge under Section
338 IPC against the appellant is clearly
established.
68. Insofar as charge under Section
337 IPC is concerned, it is amply established
from the prosecution evidence that PW-5, PW-7, PW-9 and PW-10 received
various injuries; they suffered simple hurt. The trial court as well as the
High Court was justified in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable
under Section 337 IPC as
well.
r e: question (iv )
69. The question now is whether the maximum sentence
of three years awarded to the appellant by the High Court for the offence
under Section
304Part II IPC requires any modification? It was
argued on behalf of the appellant that having regard to the facts : (i) the
appellant has already undergone sentence of two months and has paid Rs.
8,50,000/- by way of fine and compensation; (ii) the appellant is further
willing to pay reasonable amount as compensation/fine as may be awarded by this
Court; (iii) the appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of incident;
and (iv) the appellant lost his father during the pendency of the appeal and
presently being the only member to support his family which comprises of mother
and unmarried sister, he may be released on probation of good conduct and
behaviour or the sentence awarded to him be reduced to the period already
undergone.
70. Sentencing is an important task in the matters
of crime. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of
appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the
nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is
no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts
have evolved certain principles: twin objective of the sentencing policy is
deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the
gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other
attendant circumstances.
71. The principle of proportionality in sentencing
a crime doer is well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence.
As a matter of law, proportion between crime and
punishment bears most relevant influence in determination of sentencing the
crime doer. The court has to take into consideration all aspects including
social interest and consciousness of the society for award of appropriate
sentence.
72. This Court has laid down certain principles of
penology from time to time. There is long line of cases on this aspect.
However, reference to few of them shall suffice in the present case.
73. In the case of Krishnappa9, though this Court
was concerned with the crime under Section
376 IPC but with reference to sentencing by courts,
the Court made these weighty observations:
"18. ........ Protection of society and
deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be
achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing courts are
expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the
question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the
gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the
society in cases of the heinous crime of rape on innocent helpless girls of
tender years, as in this case, and respond by imposition of proper
sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of
appropriate sentence by the court. There are no extenuating or mitigating
circumstances available on the record which may justify imposition of any
sentence less than the prescribed minimum on the respondent. To show mercy in
the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice and the plea
for leniency is wholly misplaced. ........."
74. In the case of Dalbir Singh10, this Court was
concerned with a case where the accused was held guilty of the offence
under Section 304A IPC. The
Court made the following observations (at Pages 84-85 of the Report):
"1. When automobiles have become death traps
any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at
the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the
steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers,
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